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EQUITY-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
T. A. SMEDLEY*

I. INJUNCTION
A. Perpetrationof a Nuisance
B. Commission of a Trespass

C. Violation of Non-Competition Covenant
D. Prosecution of Action at Law
II.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS

III. BILL To REMOVE CLOUD ON TITLE--CLEAN HANDS MAXIM
IV. SETTING ASIDE CONSENT DECREES

During the past year noteworthy decisions have been handed down
by the Tennessee courts relating to the availability of injunctive
relief to restrain the perpetration of a nuisance, the commission of a
trespass, the violation of a non-competition covenant, and the prosecution of an action at law. A suit for specific performance required
a determination on the issue of whether the written memorandum
was sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds; and a ruling on the
application of the clean hands maxim was necessary in a suit to
remove a cloud on title. Finally, a clarification was made regarding
a chancellor's power to set aside a consent decree.
I. INJUNCTION

A. Perpetrationof a Nuisance
The Middle Tennessee Court of Appeals took advantage of an
opportunity to demonstrate the flexibility and resourcefulness which
equity is capable of exercising in deciding sensitive issues based on
conflicts of the legitimate interests of different segments of a community-in this instance, residential property owners and the operators
of a lawful business. In Crabtree v. City Auto Salvage Co.,' plaintiffs,
several residents of the area in which defendant auto salvage company is located, sued to enjoin the operation of the business on the
ground that it constituted a nuisance offensive and injurious to the
health, safety and comfort of plaintiffs and detrimental to the enjoyment of their property. Defendant denied that its business created a
nuisance, pointed out that the county government had previously
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Illinois and Virginia
Bars.

1. 340 S.W.2d 940 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
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refused to impose zoning regulations in this section, and noted that
two other auto salvage companies were carrying on the same type
of activities in the vicinity. However, the chancellor found that
defendant's business created an unsightly appearance, produced much
noise, dust, smoke and odor, greatly lessened the peaceful enjoyment
of the homes nearby, seriously depreciated residential property values, and was of no benefit to the community. An actionable nuisance
being found to exist, defendant was permanently enjoined from
operating in that area after a period of 120 days in which to liquidate
and remove the business.
The court of appeals, while refusing to overrule the finding below
that a nuisance was being perpetrated, held that under the circumstances of this case the chancellor was not justified in completely
enjoining the operation of the business. It was noted that auto salvage is not an unlawful activity which can be classified as a nuisance
per se; and while the legislature, through exercise of its zoning
powers, may entirely exclude lawful enterprises from certain areas,
a court cannot forbid such businesses but can only prohibit their
being conducted in such manner as to constitute an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of other property in the
vicinity. Therefore, the injunction was modified to restrain defendant from operating its salvage yard in a way which would cause
excessive amounts of dust to be raised and would create smoke or
noxious odors in the neighborhood. The court also noted that should
plaintiffs' other charges of offensive noise and pest-infestation be later
substantiated, the relief would be extended to cover those factors.
Controversies similar to that of the instant case, though continually
being presented to the courts for adjudication, are not susceptible to
easy determination on the basis of crystallized rules of law. In fact,
apparently inconsistent rules may be cited on behalf of each contestant. On the one hand, a lawful business is not enjoinable as a
nuisance per se,2 and persons who choose to reside in an unrestricted
area where businesses are located must submit to the discomforts and
annoyances which are incidental to the conduct of commerce. 3 On
the other hand, every business must be conducted with due regard
to the rights of others, and even a lawful business may become a4
nuisance by reason of the improper manner in which it is conducted.
2. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Elec. Ry., 42 Fed. 273, (C.C.
M.D. Tenn. 1890); Simpson v. Du Pont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 465, 85 S.E. 344
(1915).

3. L. D. Pearson & Son v. Bonnie, 209 Ky. 307, 272 S.W. 375 (1925); Thompson v. Evangelical Hosp. Ass'n, 111 Neb. 191, 196 N.W. 117 (1923).
4. Dauberman v. Grant, 198 Cal. 586, 246 Pac. 319 (1927); Clinic & Hosp.
Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (1951); Friedman v.
Keil, 113 N.J. 37, 166 Ati. 194 (1933); Kirkman v. Handy, 30 Tenn. 406 (1850).
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Thus, the court must consider all of the factors involved in the particular situation at bar, and render a decree which allows the challenged business establishment to operate with the greatest freedom
consistent with assuring the protesting neighbors their right to
reasonable use and enjoyment of their property. 5 By attempting to
reach such a result in the Crabtree case, the court, though it probably
pleased neither litigant and though it may encounter difficulties in
enforcing the decree, properly served the purpose of equity to resolve
conflicts of interests of property owners in a manner which promises
6
to be most beneficial to society generally.
The case had an objectionable aspect also. At one point in the
opinion the observation was made that
a Court of equity will enjoin and abate nuisances without a judgment

at law establishing its existence, where the fact of the nuisance is made
manifest by certain and reliable proof, and the resulting injury is of a
character that cannot be compensated adequately by damages.7

Though the statement apparently had no bearing on the outcome of
the case, it unfortunately may further the survival in Tennessee of
the nonsensical rule that, where there is any real doubt as to the
existence of a nuisance, equity cannot take jurisdiction of a suit for
an injunction until plaintiff has obtained a judgment at law which
establishes the fact that a nuisance is being perpetrated.8 Seemingly born in misunderstanding, the rule has persisted with remarkable tenacity but with little or no logical basis. Prior to 1800, the
English chancellors imposed no such condition on equity's power to
enjoin a nuisance. 9 In 1784, Lord Thurlow ruled, when asked to
enjoin a nuisance interfering with an easement, that since the existence and extent of plaintiff's easement was in dispute, equity would
not act until the rights under the easement had been settled by a law
action. 10 This ruling merely required plaintiff to resort to law to
establish his rights in the property affected, similar to the requirement that a plaintiff must establish his title in a law action before
seeking an injunction against a trespass on the land claimed by both
5. Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109 (1932); Brede
v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn. 374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919); Martin
v. Williams, 141 W. Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956).
6. Tuebner v. California-Street R.R., 66 Cal. 171, 4 Pac. 1162, 1164 (1884);
"The law looks to a medium course to be pursued by each for the mutual
benefit of all." For an excellent demonstration of such adjudicative process,
see Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927).
7. 340 S.W.2d at 945.
8. For a general discussion of this rule, see WALsH, EQurrY § 34 (1930).
9. McCLINTOCK, EQUTrY § 142 (2d ed. 1948). E.g., Bush v. Western, Pr. Ch.
530, 24 Eng. Rep. 237 (1720).
10. Weller v. Smeaton, 1 Bro.C.C. 572, 28 Eng. Rep. 1304 (Ch. 1784).
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him and the trespasser." However, in 1811, Lord Eldon seems to
have translated Thurlow's decision into a rule that there must be a
prior legal adjudication of the fact of the existence of a nuisance
though no dispute as to plaintiff's title or right in the land is involved. 12 Chancellor Kent is credited with having introduced this view
into New York law,13 and the prestige of the names of Eldon and
14
Kent led to its widespread adoption among the state courts.
A remarkable parallel exists in the development of the law in Tennessee on this point. In Caldwell v. Knott,15 the earliest relevant
case found, plaintiff sought the aid of equity to abate a nuisance in
the form of a mill dam erected by defendant which backed up water
onto plaintiff's land. Defendant claimed that the dam had been built
with the consent of plaintiff's predecessor in title and under a license
to overflow his land. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the
question of whether plaintiff had a right to have his land free of the
overflow from the dam-that is, whether the license to overflow
was actually granted, and whether, if so, it was revocable by plaintiff
-must be decided in a court of law before equity could take jurisdiction to give relief. It was there declared:
The right must be clear, manifest and undoubted, otherwise a court of
equity cannot interfere, until the right is ascertained at law. The right
must be exclusive in its character, that is, it must be inconsistent with
the assertion of a similar right in the defendant.16
It seems quite obvious that in using the word "right" the court was
referring to plaintiff's legal interest in the land for which he sought
equitable protection, just as Lord Thurlow referred to the extent of
the right under the easement for which protection was sought in
his case. However, only three years after the Caldwell decision, the
court unaccountably extended its earlier ruling by stating that
before a court of chancery would take jurisdiction in such a case,
the existence of the nuisance must be established at law; but in a case
where the right is clear and the existence of the nuisance manifest....
a court of chancery interposes to prevent the mischief.17
These propositions have been repeated with approval in several subsequent Tennessee decisions, though in most of those instances, as in
11. CLARK, EQUITY § 192 (1954); Pillsworth v. Hopton, 6 Ves.Jr. 51, 31 Eng.
Rep. 933 (Oh. 1801).

12. Attorney-General v. Cleaver, 18 Ves.Jr. 211, 34 Eng. Rep. 297 (Ch. 1811).
See Lewis, Injunctions Against Nuisances and Rule Requiring Plaintiff To
Establish His Right at Law, 47 U.

PA.

L. REV. 289 (1908).

13. Van Bergen v. Van Bergen, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 282 (N.Y. 1818).
14. See cases cited in WALSH, op. cit. supra note 8, at 176 n.22.
15. 18 Tenn. 209 (1836).
16. 18 Tenn. at 211. (Emphasis added.)

17. Vaughn v. Law, 20 Tenn. 123, 134 (1839).

(Emphasis added.)
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the Crabtree case, the court did not regard the first part of the rule
as restricting equity's interference, since the existence of defendant's
wrong was found to be manifest.18
Though it did no harm in the instant decision, the resurrection- in
the Crabtree opinion of this principle of restraint on equity's authority
to enjoin nuisances is regrettable. No good reason has ever been
advanced to show why an equity court is not fully as capable of
determining the existence of a nuisance as is a law court. The question of whether certain conduct creates a nuisance is not one which
a jury has any especial competence to decide, and chancellors are
regularly called on to resolve other issues of fact presenting as much
or greater difficulty. The requirement of a separate law action to
establish that a nuisance is being perpetrated before allowing equity
to enjoin the wrongful conduct breeds multiplicity of suits, delay in
settlement of controversies, and the sustention of irreparable injury
by the property owner. Fortunately, the rule has been repudiated
in England, in New York, where it had its American origin, and in a
number of other states.19 Especially should this anomalous limitation
on equity's power be cast off in Tennessee, where the jurisdiction of
the law and chancery courts is so largely concurrent,20 and where the
21
right of jury trial has been so broadly extended to equity cases.
B. Commission of a Trespass
In direct contrast to the restrictive attitude the Tennessee courts
have manifested in regard to nuisance abatement cases, the court of
appeals for the middle section has recently exercised sound discretion
in ignoring a traditional but unjustifiable limitation on equity's jurisdiction to enjoin trespass to land.22 Though there are some early
instances of the English chancery courts issuing injunctions against
trespasses, the view was established in England by the end of the
eighteenth century that equity had no such power, and this restriction
was brought into American law by a decision of the New Y6rk-court
in 1814.23 The basis for this limitation has been the subject of con18. Wall & Co. v. Cloud, 22 Tenn. 181 (1842); Clack v. White, 32 Tenn. 540
(1852) (injunction denied on other grounds); Weakley v. Page, 102 Tenn.
178, 53 S.W. 551 (1899). See Kirkman v. Handy, 30 Tenn. 406 (1850), where a
request for an injunction was refused because defendant's conduct which

plaintiff alleged would constitute a nuisance was as yet only a future threat,
.not a present actuality.
19. See WALSH, op. cit. supra note 8, at 176-77; DE FUNIAK, EQUITY 68 (2d

ed. 1956).
20. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 16-602 (1956).
21. TENN. CODE ANN . § 21-1011 (1956);, Moore v. Mitchell; 329 S.W.2d 821
(Tenn. 1959).
22. Doss v. Tennessee Prod. & Chem. Corp., 340 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. App.
M.S. 1960).
23. McCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra note 9, § 133.
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siderable speculation. Perhaps it lay in the cautious inclination sometimes exhibited by the English chancellors to avoid deciding
controversies involving issues classically within the domain of the
24
common law courts-such as the determination of title to land. It
has also been suggested that certain procedural and physical factors
existing at the time this rule developed rendered the chancery courts
inappropriate tribunals for trying land titles.25 These considerations
are, of course, hardly relevant to the present day, and there seems
no longer to be any sound reason for equity's refusing to take jurisdiction of a case to enjoin a trespass to land. The hostility between
and the strict separation of the common law and chancery divisions
of the judiciary are conditions long past, and certainly the chancellors are now generally as capable as are common law judges of trying
title disputes. The issues involved in such disputes are likely to be
largely issues of law rather than of fact, so that in either court they
would be decided by the court rather than the jury. And in any
case in which the circumstances are such that plaintiff will suffer
irreparable injury unless defendant is restrained from trespassing,
the inadequacy of the legal remedy sustains and demands the intervention of equity.
The textwriters evidence some difference of opinion as to the
extent of acceptance of the view that equity will enjoin a trespass
when the remedy at law is inadequate, even though a land title dispute must be resolved in the process. 26 In the code states, the merger
of law and equity has removed the question; and even where
separate systems are in operation, it is clear that in many situations
equity can best fulfill its function of protecting against irreparable
injury by intervening to enjoin a trespass, regardless of whether or
24. See Chalk v. Wyatt, 3 Mer. 688, 36 Eng. Rep. 264 (Ch. 1810), where
an injunction against trespass was granted, but the chancellor declared he
would not have given relief had not plaintiff first established his title at
law; Hickman v. Cooke, 22 Tenn. 640, 642 (1842); Erhardt v. Boaro, 113
U.S. 537, 538 (1885).
25. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 278-79: "One [reason] was that the
method of trial by deposition in equity courts was not as satisfactory for
dealing with complicated questions of property or torts as a trial in open
court which is the normal method under the common-law. .

.

. The other

was that at that time in England the chancery court sat only in Westminster while common-law courts sat in various parts of the country; hence
after the method of trial had been changed and witnesses were examined
in open court it would cause great expense to have them all come to London."
26. Compare McCLNTocK, op. cit. supra note 9, at 362 ("[Tlhis form of
relief has become one of the most common forms of injunctions.") with
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 279-80 (only a temporary injunction pending
settlement of title at law will be granted), and with WALSH, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 168 ("In non-code states the prevailing rule seems still to be that a
dispute of title must first be settled by an action at law before equity will
intervene ....

").
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not a title dispute must be settled in the process.27
It is not clear that the Tennessee courts ever have recognized this
restriction on their jurisdiction in trespass cases. In 1842, the supreme
court conceded that chancery courts have no jurisdiction "to try a
mere simple legal title to land"; but it added immediately: "Such a
power is exercised only in difficult and complicated cases, affording
peculiar grounds for equitable interference." 28 No explanation of the
precise meaning of the last clause was advanced, but the threat of
irreparable injury would ordinarily be regarded as "peculiar grounds
for equitable interference." Though no decision has been found
expressly declaring that equity has jurisdiction to enjoin a trespass
where defendant disputes the validity of plaintiff's title, there are
several instances in which this action has been taken by the courts,
without discussion in the opinion as to the existence of jurisdiction. 29
The current decision of Doss v. Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp.30
follows the same pattern, and gives further evidence that the historical limitation on equity's trespass-injunction jurisdiction, if it ever
applied in Tennessee, has now been abandoned here. In the Doss case,
the trespass which the chancellor was asked to enjoin was of a type
causing definite irreparable injury to land-timber clearing and strip
mining operations-and so equitable relief was obviously needed
urgently. On the other hand, the situation presented a title dispute
which must have been very difficult to resolve. The parties supposed
that they had purchased adjacent tracts by deeds from a prior owner
of both tracts, but the descriptions in the two deeds which would fix
the boundary between the tracts were inconsistent with each other
and were phrased in most unsatisfactory terms.31 Nevertheless, the
chancellor made his determination as to the location of the boundary,
found that plaintiff's claim of title to the disputed area was valid,
and enjoined further trespassing by defendant; and the court of
appeals affirmed without expressing any doubt as to the propriety of
the chancery court's taking jurisdiction.
In order to provide a complete remedy for plaintiff, the chancellor
27. See Shipley v. Ritter, 7 Md. 408 (1855);

§ 32.

WALSH,

op. cit. supra note 8,

28. Hickman v. Cooke, 22 Tenn. 640, 642 (1842).
29. Tuggle v. Southern Ry., 140 Tenn. 275, 204 S.W. 857 (1918); Scott
v. Goss, 43 Tenn. App. 659, 311 S.W.2d 326 (E.S. 1957). And the Tennessee
court has declared that equity has jurisdiction of cases involving bills to
remove cloud on title even though plaintiff may be in position to bring an
action at law to try the title. Almony v. Hicks, 40 Tenn. 39 (1859).
30. 340 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
31. For example, one monument in plaintiff's deed was "a rock in Higgins
Gap," and the line was said to run "eastwardly to an oak corner in line of
[a railroad]." The surveyor could not locate such an "oak corner," but
found "a large stump hole" which he took to be the remains of that particular
monument.
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awarded him supplemental legal relief in the form of damages for
the coal already removed from plaintiff's land before the suit was
brought. This action was, of course, quite proper as a means of
avoiding the imposition on both parties which would have resulted
from multiple suits. The court of appeals approved the chancellor's
setting of the damages at $1750 because the evidence showed that
5000 tons of coal had been taken from plaintiff's land and "a reasonable
value thereof was thirty-five cents a ton .... -32 By this simple declaration, the court avoided a controversy which has given trouble in other
jurisdictions as to the proper formula for measuring the damages for
wrongful mining of coal or other materials from the land of another. 33
In setting the measure of such damages, American courts ordinarily
-have made a distinction between a deliberate wrongdoer and an
unintentional wrongdoer. The former, having acted willfully in extracting and applying another's minerals to his own use, is generally
required to pay damages in the amount of the full market value of the
commodity after it was mined and ready for use.34 Thus, plaintiff
receives not only the value of the materials as they lay in his land,
but also the enhanced value produced by defendant's efforts in mining, transporting, and otherwise processing them. Since the latter
part of the award is not needed to compensate plaintiff for his actual
loss, it seems to be added as a means of punishing defendant for his
deliberate misconduct. The unintentional wrongdoer-typically one
who mines in good faith, mistakenly thinking the minerals to be in
land in which he owns the mineral rights-does not need to be
punished; so plaintiff's damages should be compensatory only, and are
generally said to be the value of the minerals as they previously
lay in place in plaintiff's land.35 Adoption of this measure, however,
merely leads to the further problem of how to evaluate unmined
minerals. Different courts have supplied different answers. One view
is that "value in place" refers to royalty value, and so plaintiff is to be
awarded whatever he could have obtained in royalties from the sale
of the mining rights. 36 This rule has been criticized because it has the
effect of forcing plaintiff to sell the mining rights to defendant and
allows defendant to make a profit, since he keeps all of the proceeds
from his sale of the minerals and is charged only with the royalty
32. 340 S.W.2d at 929.
33. For general discussions, see MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 495-96 (1935); Note,
39 Ky. L.J. 236 (1951).
34. Ward v. Spadra Coal Co., 168 Ark. 853, 272 S.W. 353 (1925); Tracy v.
Athens & Pomeroy Coal & Land Co., 115 Ohio St. 298, 152 N.E. 641 (1926).
35. Warrior Coal & Coke Co. v. Mabel Mining Co., 112 Ala. 624, 20 So. 918
(1896); 3 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES § 935 (9th ed. 1920); Developments in the
Law-Damages, 61 HAnv. L. REv. 113, 162 (1947).
36. Falls Branch Coal Co. v. Proctor Coal Co., 203 Ky. 307, 262 S.W. 300
(1924); Trustees v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa. 481, 88 Atl. 768 (1913).
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payment. Even though defendant was innocent in his wrong-doing,
the law should not allow him to profit by his illegal acts, and so most
courts have adopted yet another measure of damages to prevent that
result. This measure awards plaintiff the value of the minerals. at
the mouth of the mine, less the reasonable expense of mining them
(or if defendant has marketed the minerals, the value when sold,. less
the reasonable expense of mining and marketing).37 This view is
calculated to make allowance to defendant for his expenses in enhancing the value of the minerals but to deprive him of any profits
from his misadventure, while giving plaintiff the full amount he could
have expected to obtain by mining the minerals himself.
From the cryptic statement in the Doss opinion, it is impossible
to determine what view as to the measure of damages the court
applied, or, indeed, whether the court realized that there were different measures from which to choose. One may suspect that counsel
simply failed to take note of the matter. In fact, answer to the
damages problem in this case appears to have been supplied in 1887
by the well-considered decision in Dougherty v. Chestnutt.3 8 There
the court discussed the "harsh rule" assessing the full value of the
mined minerals against a willful wrongdoer, and the "mild rule"
applying the royalty measure against the innocent wrongdoer. The
court found the defendant to be in the latter classification, but adopted
an intermediate measure setting the damages at the value of the
minerals after being mined and processed ready for market, less the
reasonable cost (or defendant's actual cost, whichever was lower)
of the mining and processing operations. At least one later Tennessee
case expressly approved the rules announced in the Dougherty case,
and assessed the damages for wrongful removal of coal as being the
value of the coal at the mouth of the mine less the cost of mining.39
One element of uncertainty regarding the status of Tennessee law on
this point still remains, in that the cases continue to speak of a "mild
rule" as something different from the measure of mined value less
mining expenses, thus implying that the royalty value measure is
37. Dolch v. Ramsey, 57 Cal. App. 2d 99, 134 P.2d 19 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943);
Hughett v. Caldwell County, 313 Ky. 85, 230 S.W.2d 92 (1950) (changing
the Kentucky rule, which had previously allowed only the royalty value);
Pan Coal Co. v. Garland Pocahontas Coal Co., 97 W. Va. 368, 125 S.E. 226
(1924).
38. 86 Tenn. 1, 5 S.W. 444 (1887). The case involved marble wrongfully
quarried by defendant from plaintiff's farm, but the court's discussion of
the measure of damages referred to the taking of minerals generally.
39. Staub v. Sewanee Coal, Coke & Land Co., 140 Tenn. 505, 205 S.W. 320
(1917). In several other cases involving wrongful cutting of timber, the
Dougherty case has been referred to approvingly: Holt & Johnson v. Hayes,
110 Tenn. 42, 73 S.W. 111 (1902); Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Kitchen
Lumber Co., 27 Tenn. App. 468, 182 S.W.2d 4 (E.S. 1944).
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properly applicable in some situations. 40 In some of these cases the
writers of the opinions appear to have overlooked the fact that the
court in the Dougherty case applied neither the harsh nor the mild
rule but instead chose a measure which was regarded as giving more
appropriate compensation for an unintentional wrongdoing than the
mild rule does.41 However, the Staub opinion seems to indicate that
any of the three measures may be employed in Tennessee: the harsh
rule in case of willful wrongdoing, and either the Dougherty measure
or the mild rule in case of unintentional wrongdoing, depending on
42
the degree of defendant's good faith in the individual case.
C. Violation of Non-CompetitionCovenant
43
The decision in Greene County Tire & Supply, Inc. v. Spurlin,
though based on some rather puzzling reasoning, demonstrates the
continuing strong inclination of the Tennessee courts to enforce noncompetition covenants contained in contracts for the sale of a business.
In 1958, the assets of a tire company operating in Greeneville, Tennessee, were sold to plaintiff, the contract including the agreement of
defendant, one of the owners of the vendor company, that he would
not engage in a similar business for five years within a radius of 100
miles from Greeneville. A year later plaintiff, charging that defendant had re-entered the same kind of business in that city, brought
a suit in equity to enjoin him from further violation of his covenant.
Defendant argued in defense that the agreement is "unreasonable and
void," constitutes "an unlawful restraint of trade," and is "contrary
to public policy," but the chancellor upheld its validity and issued the
injunction. On appeal, the supreme court approved the rule applied
in earlier cases that such non-competition covenants of sellers of
businesses are lawful and enforceable provided they "are reasonable
44
and go no further than affording a fair protection to the buyer."
It was then decided that the area limitation imposed in the covenant
in question is excessive, because the protection needed for plaintiff's business does not require that defendant be excluded from
carrying on the same business within a distance of 100 miles. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the covenant is binding on defendant,
40. See cases cited note 39 supra, and Frankfort Land Co. v. Hughett, 137
Tenn. 32, 191 S.W. 530 (1916).
41. Holt & Johnson v. Hayes; Steams Coal & Lumber Co. v. Kitchen Lumber Co., note 39 supra.
42. See 140 Tenn. at 510-12, 205 S.W. at 322.
43. 338 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. 1960). For a discussion of other aspects of the
law relating to this case, see Hartman, Contracts-1961 Tennessee Survey,
14 VAND. L. REv.1212 (1961).

44. Citing Bradford & Carson v. Montgomery Furniture Co., 115 Tenn. 610,
92 S.W. 1104 (1906). See also Scott v. McReynolds, 36 Tenn. App. 289, 255
S.W.2d 401 (M.S. 1952).
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and the issuance of the injunction was upheld.
The opinion does not make clear how the court reconciled the
findings that the area restriction is excessive but that the covenant
itself is valid.45 Perhaps the agreement is not rendered unenforceable
merely because it has one objectionable feature, if under all the
circumstances of the case it can fairly be enforced. Such a view may
be found in a recent court of appeals decision which held that if the
area in which competition is forbidden is reasonable, the agreement is
46
not against public policy merely because it is unlimited as to time.
It may be that the Spurlin covenant is sustainable because the time
limitation was reasonable, even though the area restriction was
excessive; however, this point is not expressly made in the opinion.
Rather, the supreme court went on to determine that while the area
restriction exceeds plaintiff's need for protection, it will not inflict
"an insurmountable obstacle" on defendant in regard to his efforts to
make a living.47 Thus, though the benefit conferred on the buyer was
unreasonably broad, the detriment imposed on the seller was not
unreasonably harsh. Apparently the weight which tipped equity's
balance in favor of enforcement of the covenant was a third factorpublic interest. In this regard, it is recognized that two conflicting
public policies must be considered: (1) the policy of having all
members of society free to exercise their capacities to produce goods
and services for consumption by the public; 48 and (2) the policy of
promoting honesty in business dealings and of assuring those who
enter into contracts fairly that the terms will be enforced. 49 Since
45. Not only do the two Tennessee decisions cited in note 44 supra both
endorse rules under which such covenants are unenforceable if the restrictions are broader than is needed to protect the plaintiff's business interests,
but the same rule has been announced several times in upholding covenants
by employees not to engage in a competitive business after leaving plaintiff's
employment. Di-Deeland, Inc. v. Colvin, 347 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. 1961);
Arkansas Dailies, Inc., v. Dan, 36 Tenn. App. 663, 260 S.W.2d 200 (W.S.

1953); Matthews v. Barnes, 155 Tenn. 110, 293 S.W. 993 (1926). Accord,
Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 208 Ind. 245, 195 N.E. 277 (1935); Worrie v.

Boze, 191 Va. 916, 926, 62 S.E.2d 876, 881 (1951); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 963 (1935);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 515 (1932).

46. Scott v. McReynolds, 36 Tenn. App. 289, 255 S.W.2d 401 (M.S. 1952).
The court quoted 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 244 as its authority for this proposition.
This decision was cited with approval in the Spurlin case, 338 S.W.2d at
599-600.

47. In response to defendant's contention that the covenant was unreasonable
because it would prevent him from engaging in the kind of work which is
"his only means

of livelihood,"

the

court stated:

"[C]onsidering

the

modem facilities of travel, the obstacle as to distance from Greeneville which
the limitation places upon Spurlin in the carrying on of, or employment in,
such business does not seem to be such an obstacle as will inflict upon him
an insurmountable obstacle." 338 S.W.2d at 600.
48. See MCCLINTOcK, op. cit. supra note 9, at 192-93.

49. On this point the court quoted from Annot., 78 A.L.R. 1038, 1039 (1932)
in identifying "two public interests" which tend to sustain the enforcement
of the covenant: "the policy of promoting honesty and fidelity among men,
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specific note was taken of the fact that there is clearly a sufficient
number of persons in the tire sales and repair business in the area
in question to satisfy fully the public's need for that type of service,
the court apparently concluded that the exclusion of defendant from
this trade would not violate the first policy consideration. 50 On the
other hand, the direct relevance of the second policy to this case was
shown by the fact that defendant, having accepted valuable consideration for his promise not to compete anywhere in the area for
five years, deliberately attempted to enter a competing business in
the same city in less than one year, with no excuse other than that
he would have difficulty making a living otherwise.
Logically, it may be said that there are three tests of reasonableness
to be applied in these non-competition covenant cases: (1) is the
restriction on defendant reasonable from the standpoint of plaintiff's
need, in tlat it *is necessary to provide him due protection in the
operation of the business he has purchased; (2) is the restriction
reasonable from the standpoint of the effect it will have on defendant,
in that it leaves him still in position to be able to earn a living in
some other place or in some other occupation; (3) is the restriction
reasonable from the standpoint of the public's interest, in that the
public in the area and during the period specified will not be unduly
inconvenienced by being unable to obtain the benefits which would
accrue from defendant's engaging in the restricted activity. 51 While
it is generally assumed that if the covenant fails to meet any one of
these tests it should not be enforced in its entirety, the Tennessee
court now seems to take the position that satisfying two of the tests
may be sufficient to justify complete enforcement in equity.5 2 This
and the interests of the public as a whole in an individual's being able to
sell on the most advantageous terms whatever property he owns or has
produced, whether tangible or intangible." 338 S.W. at 600. The latter part
of the statement does not seem precisely directed toward the problem in
cases like Spurlin, as it is the buyers, rather than the sellers, who need the
aid of the law to protect the benefits for which they have contracted.
Concern for promoting the general stability of contracts seems to be more
directly in point.
50. See Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956) in which this
line of reasoning was followed in the sustaining of a covenant by defendant
not to re-enter the insurance business in a stated area; the court noted that
there were already some 250 to 300 insurance agencies serving the area in
question.
51. Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955); Securities
Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, 106 N.W.2d 456 (Neb. 1960); Meissel v. Finley,
note 50 supra; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, note 45 supra.
52. MCCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra note 9, at 192-93 regards equity's refusal
to enjoin the breach of an unreasonable non-competition covenant as an

application of the general principle that equity will not enforce an obligation

when its enforcement would cause hardship to the defendant greatly in

excess of the injury which the plaintiff will suffer from a refusal to enforce.
Thus, it is possible that equity may refuse to enforce a covenant by injunction even though the agreement is valid and an action at law for damages
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decision may introduce a new element into the law of the state; but it
is quite in accord with the favorable attitude with which the Tennessee courts have approached non-competition covenants in earlier
53
cases.
D. Prosecutionof Action at Law
Robinson v. Easter54 is of some interest in that it presents one of the
relatively few situations in which Tennessee chancery courts will
decline to take jurisdiction of a case because the complainant's
remedy at law is adequate. Traditionally, of course, inadequacy of
the legal remedy is a necessary condition to the jurisdiction of equity
over a case. Though this limitation was founded in history rather
than on logic, it continues to be in general effect except where removed by statute. Such statutory revision occurred in Tennessee in
1877, with the passage of the act which vests the chancery courts with
jurisdiction over many types of legal causes of actions. 55 Thus, in
regard to causes over which the circuit and chancery courts have
concurrent jurisdiction, the defendant's plea that the complainant
has an adequate remedy at law will generally be unavailing in
equity. 56
In the Robinson case, complainant, claiming to be a lessee, brought
suit in chancery court to enjoin an unlawful detainer action which
had been instituted by the alleged lessor before a justice of the
peace to obtain possession of a storehouse. Complainant claimed the
right to possession under an oral lease, but defendant denied the
existence of any such lease. The chancellor sustained defendant's demurrer on the ground that complainant had an adequate remedy at
law, inasmuch as the issue of the existence of a lease could be
decided in the unlawful detainer suit, and no type of extraordinary
would lie. See Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, note 51 supra, at 701. However, the buyer's cause of action for damages may be ineffectual because he
will often be unable to prove with reasonable certainty the extent of the
loss which the seller's illegal competition has caused him. Jackson v. Byrnes,
103 Tenn. 698, 34 S.W. 984 (1900); CLARK, op. cit. supra note 11, § 68.
53. No case has been found by this writer in which either the supreme
court or a court of appeals has held a non-competition covenant unenforceable. The validity of the covenants were sustained in: Jackson v. Byrnes,
note 52 supra; Bradford & Carson v. Montgomery Furniture Co., note 44
supra; Turner v. Abbott, 116 Tenn. 718, 94 S.W. 64 (1906); Baird v. Smith,
128 Tenn. 410, 161 S.W. 492 (1913); Matthews v. Barnes, note 45 supra;
Scott v. McReynolds, note 44 supra; Arkansas Dailies v. Dan, note 45 supra;
Di-Deeland, Inc. v. Colvin, note 45 supra. In Barner v. Boggiano, 32 Tenn.
App. 351, 322 S.W.2d 672 (W.S. 1948), the court, in dictum, stated that such
a covenant as plaintiff alleged was made would be invalid because the restriction on defendant was unlimited as to time or space; but the decision for
defendant was based on the court's finding that no non-competition agreement
had been made by the parties.
54. 344 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn. 1961).
55. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-602 (1956).
56. 1 GIBSON, SUITS IN CHANCERY § 301 (5th ed. 1955).
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equitable relief was needed to protect complainant's rights. This
decision was affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. While unlawful detainer actions are within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
two courts, it was held that the chancellor properly refused to retain
the case because the controversy had already been taken before a
court of law which could provide complainant with a prompt and
complete remedy. The defense of adequacy of the remedy at law
may still be effective in Tennessee, therefore, against a bill to enjoin
an action already pending before the law court, even though the cause
is within the scope of the jurisdiction of both courts. Only on a
clear showing that the processes of the law court would not provide
sufficient protection for complainant's rights would equity interfere
with the legal action and assert its own concurrent power to decide
the case.

II. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The ever-recurring problem of what constitutes a sufficient writing
to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds was dealt with in
the case of Bristerv. Estate of C. B. Brubaker.7 The purchaser sought
specific performance of a contract with decedent for the sale of land,
the only written evidence of the alleged oral agreement being in the
form of a $200 check made by plaintiff and payable to decedent.
The following notation appeared on the face of the check: "Deposit
on Lot 58 by 135 located east side of Highway 61 S 216 feet north of
Eastman Road, Shelby County, Tenn. Bal. $65.00 per front ft. due
$35.00 per month after $500.00 is paid at closing, title guaranteed."
Decedent had endorsed the check, cashed it and received the proceeds.
Defendants entered a plea of the Statute of Frauds, 8 contending
that the check is too vague, indefinite and uncertain to constitute a
contract for the sale of the land claimed by plaintiff. The defense of
laches was also set up, the suit having been filed about two and one
half years after the making of the sale agreement, and sixteen months
after decedent's death. The chancellor denied specific enforcement,
sustaining both defenses; however, he granted plaintiff a decree for
the repayment of the $200 which had been paid to decedent by the
check.
Both parties appealed that decision, and the court of appeals
57. 336 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-201 (1956): "No action shall be brought.
upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or the
making of any lease thereof for a longer term than one year . . . unless the

promise or agreement, upon which such action shall be brought, or some
memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to
be charged therewith, or some other person by him thereunto lawfully
authorized."
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reversed, remanding the case for the entry of a specific performance
decree. The laches defense was quickly overthrown on two bases.
First, the delay in bringing the suit was deemed not to be unreasonably long. This point, of course, turned on a matter of opinion on
which reasonable persons could easily differ. Secondly, however, the
court relied on the rule that to constitute laches there must be not
only lapse of time but also prejudice arising from the delay. This
proposition is too well founded to be a subject of argument, 59 and
defendants apparently had failed to show any element of prejudice
resulting from plaintiff's delay in bringing the action to enforce the
contract.
The matter of whether the check given as a down payment on the
purchase price constituted a written memorandum satisfying the
Statute of Frauds presented a more difficult question, especially in
view of some Tennesseee Supreme Court decisions which seem to
demand that the description of the land be set out quite definitely in
the writing. 60 However, the court of appeals, evidencing a commendably liberal approach, found the description adequate.
This description identifies a particular piece of land and designates its
location. Without other or further information, a surveyor could locate
and stake out this tract of land. That, in our opinion, is sufficient to
comply with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.61
In support of this general test, the court could have called upon an
observation made in a case decided in 1870:
We apprehend that the object of the statute would be met if the
memorandum were sufficiently specific to enable the officers of the court
to go into the country and find the land, and enforce its decrees against
it.62
The court also noted that even if a memorandum does not, within
itself, adequately describe the land, parol evidence is admissible to
designate the property intended, "if [the] writing appears to refer
to a particular tract of land and does not fit any other tract. '63 The
allowance of parol evidence to cure the indefiniteness of the memorandum obviously increases greatly the situations in which specific
performance relief may be granted; and nearly a century ago the
59. Conner v. Holbert, 204 Tenn. 164, 171, 319 S.W.2d 72, 75 (1958): "[M]ere
delay or laches alone is never sufficient to cause a court of equity to penalize
on account of same unless some deleterious result flows from the delay."
POMEROY, EQUnY JURISPRUmNCE § 419d (5th ed. 1941).
60. Campbell Farmers Co-op. v. Moore, 202 Tenn. 215, 303 S.W.2d 735
(1957); Denison-Gholson Dry Goods Co. v. Hill, 135 Tenn. 60, 185 S.W. 723
(1916); Sheid v. Stamps, 34 Tenn. 172 (1854).
61. 336 S.W.2d at 331.
62. Hudson v. King, 49 Tenn. 560, 572 (1870).
63. 336 S.W.2d at 331.
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Tennessee Supreme Court sanctioned the admission of such evidence
in these terms:
Where an instrument is so drawn that, upon its face, it refers necessarily
to some existing tract of land, and its terms can be applied to that one
tract only, parol evidence may be employed to show where the tract
so mentioned is located. But where the description employed is one
that must necessarily apply with equal exactness to any one of an
indefinite number of tracts, parol evidence is not admissible to show
that the parties intended to designate a particular tract by the description.64
It was further explained that the parol evidence may be admitted
if it merely "particularizes" the description of the premises which
appears in the writing, but not if it supplies a material part of the
agreement by parol. A later case, approving this rule," observed that
it means that "parol evidence is admissible to 'apply' the description
contained in the written instrument, but such evidence is inadmissible
to 'supply' a description omitted therefrom.1 65 In at least one modern
Tennessee decision, an even more extensive use of parol evidence is
approved. Whereas the Dobson v. Litton statement requires that before parol evidence is admissible the writing must be in terms which
can be applied to one tract only, it was later declared: "The
descriptive terms employed, together with the parol proof, must be
such as to point out and comprehend some especial parcel of land
to the exclusion of any other parcel of land.166 This more liberal view
seems to be endorsed by the authors of the two leading American
treatises on the law of contracts, who decry the tendency of some
courts to demand a description "that will identify beyond possibility
of doubt the subject matter of the sale," 67 or that will exclude "all
possibility that any tract, other than the one asserted, was intended
as the subject matter.168 The adoption of such a view would tend to
prevent unfortunate decisions like that in Campbell Farmers Co-op
v: Moore,69 in which the party seeking specific enforcement of a
land sale contract was not accorded any opportunity to submit parol
proof in order to establish the exact location of the property referred
to in the written memorandum. Though the description of the tract
64. Dobson v. Litton, 45 Tenn. 616, 619 (1868).
65. Parsons v. Hall, 184 Tenn. 363, 367, 199 S.W.2d 99, 101 (1947). The
Dobson case has been cited with approval repeatedly: E.g., Schultz v. Anderson, 177 Tenn. 533, 151 S.W.2d 1068 (1941); Case v. Brier Hill Collieries, 145
Tenn. 1, 235 S.W. 57 (1921); Denison-Gholson Dry Goods Co. v. Hill, note 60
supra.

66. Case v. Brier Hill Collieries, note 65 supra, 145 Tenn. at 11, 235 S.W.
at 59 (1921). (Emphasis added.)
67. 2 WUMISTON, CONTRACTS 1658 (rev. ed. 1936).
68. 2 CoBIN, CONTRACTS 719 (1950).

69. Note 60 supra.
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contained some ambiguities, there seemed to be sufficient detail
included to make possible the precise identificatioh of the land in70
tended without much difficulty.
Having concluded that the description of the land noted on the
face of the check was sufficient to satisfy the statute, the court gave
no consideration to the problem of whether the term of the statute
requiring that the writing be "signed by the party to be charged
therewith" had been fullfilled. Tennessee decisions have construed
this provision to mean that the vendor of the land is the party who
must have signed,7 ' and in the Brister case, while the vendor was
named as payee on the face of the check, his signature did not appear
thereon. Most of the cases*passing on the issue of whether a check or
note given by the purchaser for the purchase price provides a sufficient memorandum turn on the matter of whether the instrument
contains an adequate description of the land, and make little or
72
no reference to the matter of the signing by the party to be charged.
In those cases in which the instrument is held to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds, it is usually indicated, though without any particular
emphasis, that the vendor had in some way put his signature on the
back of the instrument, usually as an endorsement when cashing the
check or negotiating the note.7 3 Without this factor, it would seem
that the statutory requirement would not be met, as the mere appearance of the vendor's name as payee of the check or note is not
sufflcient. 7 4 Since in the Brister case the opinion notes that decedent
had endorsed the check upon cashing it, the court apparently assumed
that the memorandum of the contract was thereby signed by the
party to be charged therewith. However, this act of signing, being for
70. Professor Corbin's suggestion would seem especially applicable in
such a situation: "[If the court is convinced that no fraudulent substitution
of property is being attempted and that the land actually agreed upon has
been clearly established by all the evidence, including the written memorandum, the surrounding circumstances, and the oral testimony, little time should
be wasted in listening to argument that the written description is inadequate." CoRBiN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 718.

71. Ashley v. Preston, 162 Tenn. 540, 39 S.W.2d 279 .(1931).; Lusky v.

Keiser, 128 Tenn. 705, 164 S.W. 777 (1913).

72. See Annots., 20 A.L.R. 363 (1922), 153 A.L.R. 1112 (1944).
73. Clark v. Larkin, 1.72 Kan. 284, 239 P.2d 970 (1952); Purtell v.. Bell, 179

Ky. 356, 200 S.W. 644 (1918); Cousbelis v. Alexander, 315 Mass. 729, 54 N.E.2d

47 (1944); Barton v. Molin, 219 Mich. 347, 189 N.W. 74 (1922); Harper v.
Battle, 180 N.C. 375, 104 S.E. 658 (1920).
74. CoRBiN, op. cit. supra note 68, § 520: "It is not sufficient that the party's
name appears on the memorandum or document merely to identify him as
one of the contracting parties or for some other wholly extraneous purpose.
It must' have been inscribed as an authentication of the contents of the
memorandum." See, indicating that the court considered the matter of
whether the vendor had signed the instrument to *be relevant: Duteil v.
Mullins, 192 Ky. 616, 234 S.W. .192, 193 (1921); Howie v. Swaggard, 142
Miss. 409, 107 So. 556, 557 (1926); Stockdale v. Sellers, 102 Pa. Super. 447,
157 Atl. 30, 32 (1931).
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the purpose of cashing the check, can hardly be said to have been
done "as authentication of the contents of the memorandum," 75 or
to give the check "vitality as a contract" of sale, as some authorities
have demanded.76 No prior Tennessee decision has been found in
which this issue was involved, and since the point apparently was
not argued in the Brister case, the question may still be regarded as
an open one in this state.

III. BILL To REMOVE CLOUD ON TITLE-CLEAN HANDS MAXIM
The decision in Chance v. Geldreich77 aptly illustrates the limitations of the clean hands maxim7 8 as a device for precluding a party
from obtaining equitable relief in consequence of his prior inequitable
or illegal conduct. Several years before the suit was instituted, plaintiff was in need of borrowing money but had nothing to offer as
security except an apartment house already encumbered in the
amount of its full mortgage value. In order to circumvent this obstacle, she made an agreement with one of her tenants, who was
eligible for a G. I. loan, whereby she was to convey the apartment
property to the tenant, who was to obtain a loan on a G. I. full value
mortgage and then turn the money over to plaintiff and reconvey the
property to her upon her assumption of the mortgage debt. This plan
was successfully executed, but the deed of the tenant conveying back
to plaintiff was not recorded. Subsequently, the tenant complained to
plaintiff that her defaults on the mortgage debt were causing the
lender to threaten foreclosure, whereupon plaintiff apparently told
the tenant that the unrecorded deed had been destroyed and that the
tenant could do as she pleased with the property. However, the
evidence showed that the parties did not thereafter treat the property
as belonging to the tenant, and that the deed was never in fact destroyed. After about two years, the tenant conveyed the property to
defendant, who, however, had learned about the foregoing transaction and knew of the existence of the tenant's deed to plaintiff
before taking his deed to the premises. Plaintiff then sued to have
defendant's deed removed as a cloud on her title, and defendant
pleaded in defense that he was an innocent purchaser of the property.
75. CoRBiN, op. cit. supranote 68, § 520.
76. Second Nat. Bank v. Rouse, 112 Ky. 612, 134 S.W. 1121, 1122 (1911):
Defendant-vendor's endorsing the note given by vendee for the purchase price
was not to give the note "vitality as a contract" of sale, but "to invest the
bank with title to the note. This his indorsement did, and beyond that it
had no effect whatever." Also see Hibernian Petroleum Co. v. Davies, 41 Cal.
App. 59, 181 Pac. 836 (Dist. Ct. App. 1919).
77. 337 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
78. 2 PoMaRoy, EQUITY JURISPRmNCE § 397 (5th ed. 1941): "He who comes
into equity must come with clean hands."
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The chancellor rejected defendant's plea, but dismissed the complaint on the ground, among others, that because of plaintiff's illegal
conduct in obtaining the G. I. loan she was excluded from equitable
relief under the clean hands maxim.
On appeal, each ground for the chancellor's dismissal of the complaint was examined by the court of appeals and found to be inadequate.79 In regard to the clean hands factor, the issue was whether
plaintiff's misconduct, though admittedly illegal, bore a close enough
relationship to the right which she now asserted to preclude her
from equitable relief. In defining the degree of relationship which
calls for the application of the clean hands maxim, the court quoted
Gibson to the effect that
the operation of the maxim is confined to misconduct connected with
the particular matter in litigation; and does not extend to any misconduct . . . which is unconnected therewith, and with which the de-

fendant is not concerned. 80

And Pomeroy was quoted for the proposition that
a court of equity . . . will not go outside of the subject-matter of the

controversy, and make its interference to depend upon the character
and conduct of the moving party in no way affecting the equitable right

which he asserts against the defendant, or the relief which he demands.3 1

While conceding that "this entire situation ...

is due to the negli-

gent, inequitable conduct" of plaintiff, and that defendant's position

82
"is the more equitable one as between [plaintiff] and himself,"

the court still ruled that no sufficient connection between plaintiff's
misconduct and the right she asserts existed to justify a finding of
unclean hands. For one thing, the illegal transaction in which plaintiff participated was with a third party (the tenant), not with de79. In addition to the unclean hands maxim, the chancellor's bases for
dismissing the complaint were: (1) that plaintiff had in effect sold the
property to the tenant by telling the latter that plaintiff's deed to the
property had been destroyed and that the tenant might do as she pleased
with it; and (2) that plaintiff was equitably estopped to assert title to the
property. The appellate court reasoned that the only equitable principle on
which the first finding could be made is the maxim that "equity regards and
treats that is done, which, in good conscience, ought to be done"; but it
held that this maxim could not properly be applied to the case at bar because
neither plaintiff nor her tenant had ever considered the property as belonging
to the tenant. As to the second point, equitable estoppel was held not to be
properly invoked here because: (a) no estoppel was pleaded by the defendant, and this defense cannot be raised by the court itself; and (b)
plaintiff had taken no overt action which caused defendant to do a thing he
would not have done otherwise, as the latter party knew all of the facts
when he accepted the deed from the tenant. 337 S.W.2d at 773.
80. GiBsoN, SUiTs IN CHANcERY § 42 (2d ed. 1916), quoted in 337 S.W.2d at
774. The court might have referred to a more recent edition of Gibson for
the same rule. See 1 GIBsox, op. cit. supra § 51 (5th ed. 1955).
81. 2 PomRoY, op. cit. supra note 78, § 399, quoted in 337 S.W.2d at 774.
82. 337 S.W.2d at 775.
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fendant, whose claim- to title plaintiff seeks to remove by this suit.
In the second place, plaintiff is .not attempting to enforce any rights
arising out of -the G. I. loan transaction, but seeks only to protect
her title to property which long antedated that transaction.
Reference to precedent ordinarily is not very helpful in testing
the propriety of a specific application of the clean hands maxim. The
fact situations vary in every case, and the court must necessarily
be accorded broad discretion in determining when a plaintiff's conduct has been such as to require denial of relief. Further, explanations of the basis for invoking or refusing to invoke the maxim in an
individual case are almost inevitably couched in indefinite phrases
which are open to differing interpretations. 83 The Tennessee court,
in laying down rules to indicate what connection must exist between
the plaintiff's past misconduct and present claim to justify a finding
of unclean hands, has understandably had trouble in being specific
enough in its language to make its meaning clear. In a very early case
it was said that "if a complainant's cause of action originates in
inequity," equity should deny relief;8 4 and later even broader terms
were employed in declaring that relief would be refused if plaintiff
has been guilty of unconscientious, inequitable or immoral conduct,
in and. about the same matters whereof he complains of his adversary, or
if his claim to relief grows out of, or depends upon, or is inseparably
connected with his own prior fraud.8 5
In more modern cases, the court has spoken in terms which seem to
demand a closer and more obvious connection. Thus, Overton v.
Lewis, cited approvingly in several later decisions, declared that the
misconduct "must relate directly to the very transaction concerning
which complaint is made, '86 and that the wrongful act "must bear
an immediate relation to the subject matter of the suit. '87 It is said
that this direct and immediate relation does exist when a debtor
who has conveyed his property in order to delay, hinder or defraud
his creditors asks equity to aid him by forcing the collusive grantee
to reconvey the property. 88 However, in the Chance case the court
83. See Note, 5 WAYNE L. REV. 263 (1959), pointing out that such terms as
"indirect and remote," used to designate insufficient connection between the
plaintiff's misconduct and the subject matter of the current litigation, and
"immediate and necessary," used to designate sufficient connection, are largely
statements of conclusion rather than of reason.
84. Goodwin v. Hunt, 11 Tenn. 123, 126 (1832), quoted with approval in
Christians v. Town of East Ridge, 12 Tenn. App. 101 (E.S. 1928).

85. C. F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co., 93 Tenn. 84, 94,
S.W.165, 168 (1893).
86. 152 Tenn. 500, 509, 279 S.W. 801, 804 (1925), quoted with approval
Chappell v. Dawson, 202 Tenn. 672, 308 S.W.2d 420 (1957).
87. 152 Tenn. at 510, 279 S.W. at 804, quoted with approval in Seaton
Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544 (E.S. 1953).
88. Rosenbaum v. Huebner, 277 Ill. 360, 115 N.E. 558 (1917); Bellin

23
in
v.
v.
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found no such relation where, after in effect conveying to defraud
a prospective creditor, plaintiff covertly regained the title from the
original' grantee who then attempted to convey the property to a
third party.
The court, in placing significance on the fact that defendant had
not been a party to the fraudulent transaction, may have intended
to adopt the view that a defendant cannot bar relief under the clean
hands maxim unless he has been prejudiced by plaintiff's misconduct.
If so, it has the support of at least one prior Tennessee decision, as
well as cases in some other jurisdictions. 89 On the other hand, another Tennessee case and decisions in yet other jurisdictions adopt the
view that plaintiff's wrongful acts may preclude him from obtaining
equitable relief even though they have-caused no injury to defendant. 90 And the rule applied in fraudulent conveyances cases would
seem to support this position, as the grantee of such conveyance has
ordinarily not been harmed by, but has instead profited from, the
fraud.
Considering the nature of the clean hands maxim and the purpose
of its employment by equity, however, one is rarely justified in saying that a court has clearly been wrong in declining to refuse relief
because of unclean hands. Certainly it must necessarily be true that
"in applying the maxim, the courts are not bound by formula or
restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel the free and
just exercise of discretion." 91
IV. SETTING AsIDE CONSENT DEcREEs
Kelly v. Walker92 is worthy of notice as a clarification of the Tennessee rule regarding the status of a consent decree entered in
chancery court. Here it appeared that a consent decree had been
entered in favor of complainants in a suit which had been pending
for seven years; but within thirty days thereafter defendant filed a
petition to have the decree set aside on the ground that she had
not authorized her attorney to agree to such a disposition of the case.
The chancellor sustained complainant's demurrer, applying a rule of
English origin which has repeatedly been held controlling in regard
Bloom, 217 Ind. 656, 28 N.E.2d 53 (1940); GiBsox, op. cit. supra note 56, § 51;

PoMERoY, op. cit. supra note 78, § 401a.
89. Nolen v. Witherspoon, 182 Tenn. 333, 339, 187 S.W.2d 14, 16 (1944),
citing decisions in Kentucky and Washington, and references in legal
encyclopedias. See also POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 78, at 99.
90. Christians v. Town of East Ridge, supra note 84; Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young,
46 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Wis. 1942); Note, 5 WAYNE L. REV., supra note 83, at
265.
91. Vanity Fair Mills v. Cusick, 143 F. Supp. 452, 455 (D.N.J. 1956).
92. 346 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn. 1961).
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to the finality of consent decrees: "Where a decree is made by consent of counsel, there lies not an appeal or re-hearing, though the
party did not really give his consent; but his remedy is against his
counsel . . . -93 However, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed,
finding that under the circumstances of this case the chancellor had
not exercised his discretion soundly, and remanded the case for a
hearing on the merits. While approving the rule quoted above as
appropriate for a case in which the decree had become final, the
supreme court noted that it should not apply in the case before it.
Defendant having raised his objections within thirty days,0 4 "the
present consent decree is still within the breast of the court and it
is still within the power of the court to do anything the facts and
circumstances demand . . . ."95 Therefore, since defendant, by filing
his sworn petition denying that his counsel was authorized to enter
a consent decree, had overcome the presumption of such authority
in counsel, the chancellor should have held a hearing on the merits
to determine whether or not the authority did exist.
93. Bradish v. Gee, Amb. 229, 27 Eng. Rep. 152 (Ch. 1754). However, if the
consent of counsel was obtained by fraud, the party against whom the decree has been entered may have it set aside. This view has been adopted in
numerous Tennessee decisions: Clinchfield Stone Co. v. Stone, 36 Tenn. App.
252, 254 S.W.2d 8 (E.S. 1952). See GmasoN, op. cit. supra note 56, § 619;
Kentucky-Tennesseee Light & Power Co. v. Beard, 152 Tenn. 348, 277 S.W.
889 (1925); Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 82 S.W. 171 (1904); Jones v.
Williamson, 45 Tenn. 371 (1868).
94. Under TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-312 (1956), thirty days is the time allowed
for seeking an appeal from a judgment or decree of an inferior court to the
court of appeals or supreme court.
95. 346 S.W.2d at 256.

